

Towards Secure Input Handling in C/C++ Code

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Overview

- **Defensive programming**
- Static analysis
 - Coverity
 - Cppcheck
 - clang-analyzer
- **Dynamic analysis**
 - Valgrind
 - Sanitizers in clang
- **Coverage-guided fuzzy testing**



Defensive programming

- Code:
 - Arbitrary input sanitization
 - Buffer boundary checking
 - Error codes checking
- Development process:
 - Writing well-arranged and readable code
 - Doing code reviews
 - Writing tests



Defensive programming – Example

```
wire_ctx_t rr = wire_ctx_init_const(rr_data, rr_size);

uint16_t rtype = wire_ctx_read_u16(&rr);
uint16_t rclass = wire_ctx_read_u16(&rr);
uint32_t ttl = wire_ctx_read_u32(&rr);
uint32_t rdlen = wire_ctx_read_u32(&rr);

if (rr.error) {
    return KNOT_EMALF;
}

/* further procesing */
```



Dynamic analysis

- Instruments running code
- Faulty state has to be reached
- Usually single-purposed analysis (memory, threads, etc.)
- Available analyzers:
 - Valgrind
Memcheck, Cachegrind, Callgrind, Massif, Hellgrind, DRD
 - clang sanitizers
Address Sanitizer, Memory Sanitizer, Leak Sanitizer,
Thread Sanitizer, Dataflow Sanitizer, Control Flow Integrity



Dynamic analysis – Memory

Valgrind: Memcheck

- Virtual machine, compiled code translation
- Out-of-boundary access, uninitialized reads, memory leaks
- Limited support for global objects and stack variables (SCGCheck)
- Costs: 10-50× run time, 12-18× used memory


clang: Address Sanitizer

- Instrumentation code added during compilation, *-fsanitize=address*
- Checks possible for global objects and stack variables
- No uninitialised reads checking (Memory Sanitizer)
- Costs: 1.5-3× run time, 2-4× used memory



Address Sanitizer – Essentials

- ASAN reserves all usable memory
- Any memory access is checked
- Keeps track of allocations in the *Shadow* part of the memory (one-eighth of all memory)



- Example for 8-byte structure access:

```
shadow = (addr << 3) + offset;  
if (*shadow) {  
    report_and_crash(addr);  
}
```



Coverage-guided fuzzy testing

- Useful where arbitrary input is processed
- More effective than blind fuzzy testing
- Simplified execution loop:
 1. Take an input from the corpus
 2. Perform some modification on the input
 3. Run the code with the new input
 4. Take a look at the coverage
 5. Update the corpus if the input produced an interesting code path



Coverage-guided fuzzy testing – Tools

American Fuzzy Lop (AFL)

- Uses LLVM/clang hooks
- Single-shot and persistent fuzzing
- Synthesizing complex input semantics
- Experimental testing of black-box binaries (in QEMU)

LibFuzzer

- Heavily inspired by AFL
- Depends on coverage support in clang sanitizers
- Real coverage, no approximation
- Instruction traces (experimental)



LibFuzzer - Like a Pro in Three Slides (1)

- Write the test driver:

```
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "libknot/pkt.h"

int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data,
                           size_t size)
{
    knot_pkt_t *pkt = knot_pkt_new(data, size, NULL);
    knot_pkt_parse(pkt, 0);
    knot_pkt_free(&pkt);

    return 0;
}
```



LibFuzzer - Like a Pro in Three Slides (2)

- Compile LibFuzzer:

```
% cd ~devel/llvm-3.7.0/lib  
% clang -g -O2 -c -std=c++11 -IFuzzer Fuzzer/*.cpp  
% ar rcs Fuzzer.a Fuzzer*.o
```

- Compile the test driver:

```
% clang -fsanitize=address -fsanitize-coverage=edge \  
-g -O2 -o fuzz fuzz.c Fuzzer.a -lstdc++
```

- Start fuzzing:

```
% ./fuzz
```



LibFuzzer - Like a Pro in Three Slides (3)

- Find a bug:


```
==30094==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ...  
WRITE of size 1 at 0x60600000efbf thread T0  
    #0 0x4d3843 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /tmp/fuzz.c:12:26  
    ...  
    #9 0x41d648 in _start (/tmp/fuzz+0x41d648)  
    ...  
==30094==ABORTING  
DEATH:  
0x61,0x62,0x2a,0x83,0x61,0x73,  
ab*\x83as  
CRASHED; file written to crash-1cef67f42be69e7d3f01c3d5e1f5112ce3e66ece  
Base64: YWlqg2Fz
```

- Fix the bug:

```
% ./fix-bug-automagically.php || vim
```

- Rinse and Repeat.





Thank you!

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